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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
ROBERT MITCHELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050754-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Mitchell's motion for a new trial? 
This issue is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion'* standard. Slate v. Pirela, 65 P.3d 
307. 310 (Utah App. 2003). This issue was preserved in a motion for new trial ~*iled 
within ten days of sentencing (R. 194) and through the subsequent filing of supporting 
affidavits (R. 203-05, 208-11). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are contained in the Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Robert Mitchell appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment and the 
denial of his motion for a new trial after he was convicted of theft, a second degree 
felony, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in Fourth District Court before the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Robert Mitchell was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District Court 
on September 30, 2002, with theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-404, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2)(c)(d) (R. 1). On February 14, 2003 a preliminary hearing 
was held and Mitchell was bound over for trial upon a finding of probable cause b> the 
trial court (R. 27, 237: 28). On February 27, 2003 Mitchell was arraigned and plead not 
guilty to the charges (R. 30). 
On April 6, 2004 Mitchell filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence 
relating to prior convictions and other bad acts pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b) and 609 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 103-09). Mitchell re-filed the motion on August 19, 2004 
(R. 129-35). On August 20, 2004 the trial court denied this motion (R. 148, 240: 15-18). 
On August 23-24, 2004 a jury trial was held with Judge Claudia Laycock 
presiding. After deliberating for almost 2.5 hours, the jury found Mitchell guilt)' of both 
counts (R. 153-159A, 186-87, 235, 238). At the close of the State's case, Mitchell made a 
motion to dismiss the theft charge alleging that the State had failed to prove the "purpose 
to deprive'* element (R. 235: 46-47). Mitchell also made a motion that it was improper 
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for him to be charged with both theft and criminal mischief under the ShcmdeJ doctrine; 
and that criminal mischief should merge into the theft charge (Id. at 47-49). 
On October 7. 2004 Mitchell was sentenced to 36 months probation. In addition, 
he was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $1,160.00 and was ordered to pay 
restitution totaling $14,990.32 (R. 190-92). 
On Monday. October 18, 2004 Mitchell filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that 
jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in rendering their decision, and on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence (R. 194). On November 8. 2004 the State filed a 
response alleging that the motion for new trial should be dismissed because it was not 
accompanied by ''affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion" 
(R. 197-99). 
On November 12. 2004 Mitchell filed a request for an extension of time in v.hich 
to obtain and file all attachments necessary to his motion for a ncv\ trial, citing Ru e 34(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that, "If additional time is 
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the 
motion for such time as it deems reasonable" (R. 201-02). 
On November 22. 2004 an affidavit from Brooke Karrington. a private 
investigator, was filed by Mitchell in support of his motion for new trial (R. 203-05). 
Kairington interviewed jurors and learned the following: One. that it was the consensus 
of the jury that Archuleta was involved in the incident and that he'd been offered a 
favorable deal from the State in exchange for his testimony against Mitchell. Two, that 
this was an assumption made by the jury rather than gleamed directly from any evidence. 
Three, that the jury was frustrated that the State had arranged a plea agreement w ith 
Archuleta but not Mitchell. 
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On January 10, 2005 a second supporting affidavit of Karrington was filed by 
Mitchell (R. 208-11). In this affidavit, it was Karrington's sworn statement based on an 
interview with Cecil Henningson, the owner of the truck that formed the basis of the theft 
charge. According to Karrington, Henningson told her the following: One, that Archuleta 
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing. 
Two, that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into 
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next day. Three, that he did not see 
Archuleta on the early morning of the incident as had been reported to police by 
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was involved in the theft 
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows. 
On August 2, 2005 Judge Laycock issued a written ruling denying Mitchell's 
motion for a new trial (R. 222-30). 
On August 30, 2005 Mitchell filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R. 
232). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Cecil Henningson 
Cecil Henningson works for Commander Concrete and as part of his employment 
he is provided with a company car, a 1999 silver Ford F350 that he has driven since July 
of 2002 (R. 238: 93-94). The truck has a big flatbed and tool boxes with "Commander 
Concrete" decals on the side (R. 238: 94). On Sunday, August 4, 2002 the truck was 
"stolen" out of Henningson" s driveway (Id. at 94, 131). 
Early that morning at approximately 3 a.m., Henningson was awakened by the 
sound of the truck backing out of the driveway (R.238: 95). He ran outside and saw that 
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the truck was indeed gone before calling 911 (Id.). As he was on the phone with dispatch 
he saw the uwtruck coming off of the street just below" (Id.). He heard the engine die and 
then start again (R. 238: 117). Henningson again exited the house and from 
approximately his mail box, he saw the truck was being driven off the hill (R. 238: 96, 
109). Another vehicle was following the truck (R. 238: 116). Henningson had left the 
keys in the truck, hanging from the steering column on the tip wheel with the doors 
unlocked (R. 238:98). 
Henningson testified that he had given no one permission to use the truck (R. 238: 
97-98). At the time of this incident Henninson did not know Robert Mitchell nor give 
him permission to take the truck (R. 238: 98). When he went outside after the truck had 
been taken, he didn't observe anyone on the street but didn't really look around (R. 238: 
110). 
At around 11 a.m. on the same morning, Henningson received a call from; the Utah 
County Sheriffs Department that the tuck had been located in the Highline CanaL east of 
his home in Salem (R. 238: 99). He went to the canal and saw his trucked parked in it. 
nose down with water up to the hood on the driver's side and up over the hood on the 
passenger side (R. 238: 100). The truck was not rumiing and a broom, that was kept in 
the truck, was lodged between the gas pedal and the back of the seat (Id.). 
A tow truck pulled it out of the canal and took it to there impound lot before it was 
taken to Smith Ford for repair (R. 238: 103). Once repairs were completed, Henningson 
picked it up and paid for the repairs with a check (R. 238: 104). He couldn't remember 
the cost of the repairs and he turned the receipt in to his employer (Id.). Exhibit #4 is a 
receipt from Smith Ford showing the cost to be just over $14,000 and then an additional 
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$500 was paid for carpet replacement (R. 238: 105-06). Henningson testified that prior to 
the time the truck was stolen, it had needed no repairs (R. 238: 106). 
B. Michael Richard Atwood 
Michael Atwood is a resident of Salem; his address is 122 North 550 East (R. 238: 
119-20). During the first weekend in August of 2002, a palm pilot was taken from his 
suburban which was parked in his driveway (Id. at 120-21). A few days later he reported 
it to the police after hearing from some neighbors that there had been some burglaries in 
the neighborhood (R. 238: 122). The palm pilot was returned to him by the Spanish Fork 
police after Atwood had a discussion with Steve Adams, a Spanish Fork officer (Id. at 
123-24). Atwood went to the Spanish Fork police department on August 22nd. 
approximately 2 weeks after it had been missing, and was able to identify the palm pilot 
by serial number (Id. at 124). Atwood testified that he is able to hear the difference 
between a diesel truck engine and a regular engine but that he didn't hear a diesel iruck 
on the night the palm pilot was taken (Id. at 125-26). 
C. Scott Dibble 
Scott Dibble is a detective with the Salem Police Department (R. 238: 132-33). 
On August 4, 2002 at approximately 10:30 a.m. he was contacted by dispatch about a 
truck that had been found submerged in the Highline Canal (Id. at 133). The canal is used 
for irrigation purposes and begins at the mouth of Spanish Fork Canyon and follows the 
base of the mountain from Spanish Fork to Santaquin (Id. at 134). 
When he arrived at the canal he saw a Commander Concrete flatbed Ford truck 
submerged (R. 238: 135). Dibble took photographs of the truck and when he looked 
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inside he saw a broom that was positioned towards the gas pedal and then up onto the 
driver's seat (Id. at 135-36). After the truck was removed from the canal h\ a tow 
compam, Dibble inventoried the contents of the truck and called Henningsom ilvj truck's 
owner who had previously reported it missing (Id. at 137-38). Dibble found "eight 
chrome wing nuts for a valve coven a half-inch silver wrench, a piece of black hose and a 
chrome screen" in a bucket in the bed of the truck (Id. at 137). Dibble testified that 
Henningson denied ownership of any of these items (Id. at 138). Dibble also testified that 
these items were eventually returned to their owner. Todd Hales (Id. at 141). 
After the truck was taken to the impound yard, five visible finger prints w ere lifted 
from it (R. 238: 143). The prints were rejected by the Crime Lab because of the poor 
quality of the prints (Id. at 144). 
Dibble testified that the distance between where the truck was ditched and 
Mitchell's residence was approximately 5 miles, but that the distance between the Truck's 
location and Tyler Archuleta's residence was only a mile "rough!) as the crow fic;T (R. 
238: 147). 
Dibble also went to Todd Hales' house on August 4, 2002 at approximate!} 8 a.m. 
on a report of a vehicle burglary (Id. at 193). Dibble lifted a couple of fingerprints of the 
Nova but the Crime Lab was unable to process them (Id. at 195). 
During the defendant's case, Dibble testified that he was the lead officer on ihe 
case involving the theft of the truck, the palm pilot and some auto parts but that until he 
spoke with Archuleta on August 18. 2002 he had no leads on these thefts (R. 235: 77-78). 
Archuleta did not mention to Dibble about 1 iving in Las Vegas (Id. at 78). Nor did he 
write anything in his report about Archuleta telling him about a blue car following the 
truck as it was stolen (Id. at 79). Dibble also testified that Archuleta had been told by 
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Mitchell that Archuleta's cousin, Jerald Haskel was driving the car that followed the truck 
(Id. at 80). 
D. Steve Adams 
Steve Adams is an officer with the Spanish Fork Police Department (R. 238: 150-
51). Michael Atwood is his dentist and he knows the Atwood family (Id. at 151). 
Adams testified that he became aware from another officer that there might be stolen 
property at Mitchell's apartment (Id. at 172). On August 14, 2002 Adams went to 
Mitchell's apartment and obtained consent from him to conduct a search (Id. at 151-52, 
172). Adams located a palm pilot in the living room (Id.). The palm pilot was the type 
that didn't have its own battery but a charging system and a cradle that was required to 
see the information on it (Id. at 152). On August 22, 2002 Adams identified the palm 
pilot as belonging to Atwood because he brought his charger to the station and "look the 
palm pilot charged it up, opened it up and it ended up having his information on it" (Id. 
at 152-53). 
Adams didn't know if Archuleta was living in the apartment with Mitchell nor 
who had handled the palm pilot or who had left it in the apartment (R. 238: 153-55). 
Adams did not attempt to take finger prints off the palm pilot (Id. at 154-55). Adams 
testified that Mitchell indicated that he had purchased it for "$300 among other items we 
found in the apartment" (Id. at 155). Mitchell gave him the name "Berry7" as the seller but 
Adams "was not able to actually find that person" (Id.). The other items consisted of 
tackle boxes, a toolbox, cordless drill, fishing rod and reel, cd player and cd's; four of the 
items were stolen goods (Id. at 173-74). 
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E. Todd Hales 
Todd Hales lives at 575 East 180 North in Salem (R. 238: 179). On a Sunca} 
morning in August of 2002, he reported a theft at his residence to Dibble (Id. at : 79-80). 
A 1970 Chevy Nova he was working on was cttore to pieces" and his motorcycle and its 
saddlebags had been "ransacked" (Id. at 180, 187). It had been parked in the carport on 
the right side of his house, visible from the front yard (Id. at 188). Missing from the car 
was the "whole top of the engine, intake manifold, carburetor" (Id.). Two or three 
months later the missing items were recovered and returned to him by the police (Id. at 
181-82). Flales testified that he was also missing eight valve cover bolts and probably 
some tools (Id. at 183-84). Some other parts were found b) Hales up the road, back to 5th 
West and towards the canal (Id. at 191-92). Hales never heard a diesel engine that night 
(Id. at 192). 
Hales testified that his son. Brennan, and Tyler Archuleta used to be friend? f R. 
238: 186-87). Hales testified that he may have told Archuleta about the car pans that had 
been taken (Id. at 187). 
F. Brad Bishop 
Brad Bishop is a police officer for Salem City/ (R. 238: 196-97). On August 18. 
2002 he received information that some stolen property was in a four-door Old^mobile at 
the Mitchell Apartments, 32 East 300 South in Spanish Fork (Id. at 197-99). When he 
arrived at the apartments, Bishop first made contact with Frank Mitchell, the apartment 
owner who lived next door in a house (Id. at 198-99). Bishop told Frank about the report 
and obtained permission to search the trunk of the vehicle (Id. at 199). ITe gained access 
to the trunk through the removal of the backseat because Frank didn't have the key to the 
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trunk (Id. at 200). Inside the trunk, Bishop found an aluminum Edelbrock intake 
manifold, a Quadrajet carburetor and some black speaker grills (Id. at 199-201). 
Bishop set up an interview between Archuleta and Dibble; and that Mitchell and 
Archuleta were friends (Id. at 204-05). 
F. Frank Mitchell 
Frank testified that Mitchell was a tenant of his in Spanish Fork in August of 2002 
(R. 238: 207-08). At that time, Frank was in the process of evicting Mitchell because wChe 
was behind on his rent and he had a bunch of other people living with him, men and 
woman, both" (Id. at 208). Archuleta was one of the individuals living with Mitchell at 
the time (Id. at 214). 
Frank met with Bishop during that August (Id. at 209). He had a broken 1989 
Oldsmobile that Mitchell and another tenant had been working on (Id.). Mitchell was 
overhauling the whole motor (Id. at 213). Bishop told him that he was looking for auto 
parts and requested permission to search the vehicle (Id. at 209-10). Frank gave 
permission and indicated that he, too, had concerns "because I had been working on my 
car. And there was a lot of new parts put in there, so I showed [Bishop] all the receipts 
that I had documented, new parts that was in my vehicle" (Id. at 211). Frank didn": have 
a key to the trunk because he had given it to Mitchell (Id.). When they got the backseat 
out of the car, Frank watched Bishop remove several items from the trunk. 
G. Tyler Archuleta 
Tyler Archuleta testified that he is twenty years old and has lived in Salem with his 
grandparents for most of his life (R. 235: 5-6). Archuleta has known Mitchell since 
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junior high and were verv good friends until 2002 (Id. at 6-7). In August of 2002. 
Archuleta had just returned irom Las Vegas and was again living with his grandparents at 
110 North, 500 East in Salem (Id. at 7-8). 
Archuleta is familiar with Commander Concrete as one of its emplcnees. Cecil, 
lives two houses down from his grandparents' house (Id. at 8). During August. Cecil's 
truck "come up missing'* (Id.). Archuleta testified that he was outside having a smoke on 
the corner between midnight and 4 a.m. when he saw "the truck pull out [of Cecil's 
residence]. It stalled. lie took off, went up towards 180,1 believe and turned right" (Id. 
at 8-10). He observed a "light bluish-colored car behind if (Id. at 26). Until trial, he had 
not mentioned that it was a light blue car that followed (Id.). Archuleta put out his 
cigarette and went back inside the house (Id. at 10-11, 23). The next morning he had a 
conversation with Cecil about the truck being taken but didn't tell him he'd seen it drive 
awaj (Id. at 31-32). 
Archuleta subsequently had a conversation with Mitchell at his apartment in 
Spanish Fork (Id. at 11-12). He remembers telling Mitchell that the "Commands: 
Concrete truck down the road had been ganged" or stolen (Id. at 13). Archuleta then 
testified that Mitchell told him. "there was a Commander Concrete truck the) were 
around the other day. they were by when that particular-that particular night and he had 
used a broomstick they used to ditch i f (Id. at 13). The broomstick had been wedged 
between the seat and the gas pedal and they let the truck go into a canal, which Archuleta 
figured had to be the Highline Canal (Id. at 13-14). 
Archuleta also had a conversation with Mitchell at the Utah Count} Jail when he 
went to visit with Mitchell who was incarcerated (Id. at 14-15). Archuleta testified that 
during this conversation, Mitchell "asked me politely to get rid of some moior parts that 
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were in the trunk of a car" which was a brown Bonneville that belonged to Frank Mitchell 
(Id. at 16). Archuleta said he told Mitchell he couldn't help him and that Mitchell told 
him he was screwed then (Id.). Archuleta had assisted Mitchell in working on the car 
previously, "put in a bolt" etc. (Id. at 32). 
Archuleta eventually met with the police at the Salem Police Department (Id.). lie 
spoke with Officer Dibble and told him about his conversations with Mitchell (Id. at 17). 
Archuleta is no longer really friends with Mitchell (Id. at 17-18). Archuleta denied any 
involvement in the theft of the truck or any other items that had been taken from the 
neighborhood (Id. at 18-19). 
To prepare for his testimony, Archuleta reviewed a report that had been prepared 
by Dibble (Id. at 20). 
H. John Taylor 
John Taylor is a deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Department (R. 235' 40). 
Taylor is assigned to the jail and testified that on August 15, 2002 Mitchell was visiied b} 
Archuleta for no more than 30 minutes per jail policy (Id. at 40-42). 
I. Ron Jackson 
Ron Jackson was previously employed as a police officer for Salem City (R. 235: 
72). On August 4, 2002 at approximately 3:30 a.m. he was dispatched to a vehicle theft 
in progress at 128 North 500 East (Id.). Approximately three minutes later he arrived at 
the residence and made contact with the owner, Cecil Henningson; the vehicle was 
already gone (Id. at 72-73). Jackson could not recall seeing anyone in the vicinity outside 
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smoking a cigarette (Id. at 73-74). While he traveled to the residence, Jackson Kept his 
eyes out for the truck but did not see it (Id. at 75-76). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mitchell asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
new trial on both procedural and substantive grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Mitchell was convicted b> a jury of theft and criminal mischief, both second 
degree felonies. Within ten days of sentencing-on October 18, 2004-he filed ? Motion 
for New Trial alleging that jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in rendering 
their decision, and on the basis of newly discovered evidence (R. 194). On November 8, 
2004 the State filed a response alleging that the motion for new trial should be dismissed 
because it was not accompanied by "affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support 
of the motion" (R. 197-99). 
On November 12, 2004 Mitchell filed a request for an extension of time in which 
to obtain and file all attachments necessary to his motion for a new trial, citing Rule 24(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that, "If additional time is 
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the 
motion for such time as it deems reasonable" (R. 201-02). 
On November 22, 2004 an affidavit from Brooke Karrington, a private 
investigator, was filed by Mitchell in support of his motion for new trial (R. 203-05). 
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Karrington interviewed jurors and learned the following: One. that it was the consensus 
of the jury that Archuleta was involved in the incident and that he'd been offered a 
favorable deal from the State in exchange for his testimony against Mitchell. Two. that 
this was an assumption made by the jury rather than gleamed directly from any evidence. 
Three, that the jury was frustrated that the State had arranged a plea agreement with 
Archuleta but not Mitchell. 
On January 10, 2005 a second supporting affidavit of Karrington was filed b) 
Mitchell (R. 208-11). In this affidavit, it was Karrington\s sworn statement based on an 
interview with Cecil Henningson, the owner of the truck that formed the basis of the theft 
charge. According to Karrington, Henningson told her the following: One, that Archuleta 
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing. 
Two, that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into 
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next day. Three, that he did not see 
Archuleta on the early morning of the incident as had been reported to police by 
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was involved in the theft 
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows. 
On August 2, 2005 Judge Laycock issued a written ruling denying Mitchell's 
motion for a new trial (R. 222-30). One, the trial court denied the motion on procedural 
grounds. Namely, that Mitchell's request to extend the time for the filing of supporting 
affidavits was untimely under Rule 24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
that accordingly, they should not be considered: "The rule does not allow the defendant to 
drop off a one-paragraph motion at the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24( c) 
and to then find the necessary evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as 
happened in this case. Clearly the rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission 
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for and schedule such extensions of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickh as 
possible" (R. 226). 
Two. the trial court also denied the motion on substantive grounds: 
One, Karrington's sworn statements contained in the affidavits were unreliable and 
inadmissible. As to what she learned from interviews with un-named jurors, it is 
inadmissible hearsay under Rules 80 L 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Id.). And that 
proper affidavits would have "included each juror's sworn and notarized testimony": and 
that Karrington's "report of what some jurors said cannot be relied upon b\ the Court in 
making its decision at this time" (R. 225). The trial court found the second affidavit to be 
similarly deficient (Id.); and that Henningson\s opinion as to Archuleta's guilt was 
inadmissible and irrelevant (Id.). Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion for new 
trial on grounds that the two affidavits were only conjecture and inadmissible hearsay 
(Id.). 
Two. that "none of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there was an}' 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the 
defendant as per Rule 24(a)" (R. 224-25). In regards to the first affidavit about the jurv. 
the trial court concluded that "the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's 
consideration that Mr. Archuleta had made a deal with the state in exchange for nis 
testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial" namely because the jurors claims 
were basically that Archuleta and Mitchell were both guilty (R. 224). As to the second 
affidavit, the trial court concluded that wtthe defendant had ample opportunity at trial to 
explore the facts claimed [in this affidavit] and to impeach the testimony of Mr. 
Archuleta. There is no relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would 
justify a new trial." 
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A, The trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial on procedural grounds. 
In her written ruling denying Mitchell's motion for a new trial Judge Laycock 
concluded on procedural grounds that the motion was not timely. Namely, that Mitchell's 
request to extend the time for the filing of supporting affidavits was untimely under Rule 
24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and that accordingly, they should not be 
considered: wThe rule does not allow the defendant to drop off a one-paragraph motion at 
the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24( c) and to then find the necessary 
evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as happened in this case. Clearly the 
rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission for and schedule such extensions 
of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickly as possible" (R. 226). In reaching this 
conclusion, she cited to State v. Hanigan, 2002 UT App 424. Mitchell asserts that the 
trial court's legal interpretation of Rule 24 is incorrect and that she abused her discretion 
in denying his motion on procedural grounds. 
Rule 24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "A motion for 
new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Mitchell complied with 
this rule by filing a motion for new trial on October 18, 2004 within the ten-day period. 
In Hanigan, this was not the case. There the defendant failed to file a motion for new7 
trial within the ten days and his request for an extension to file said motion was also 
made outside of the proscribed ten day period. 
In this case, Mitchell filed a timely motion for new trial. But he sought leave for 
additional time within which to file supporting affidavits. He asserts that such additional 
time to file supporting affidavits is not governed by subsection 24( c) but rather 
subsection 24(b) of the same rule. Subsection 24(b) reads: "A motion for new trial shall 
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be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied b\ affidavits or 
ev idence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to 
procure affidavits or evidence the court ma\ postpone the hearing on the motion for 
such time as it deems reasonable.'* 
Mitchell filed in writing a motion for new trial and gave notice to the Stare of his 
intent. Rule 24(b) clearly anticipates that more time may likely be required to secure all 
of the necessary affidavits and other supporting evidence. That is all he was seeking 
with the extension; and there is no requirement that such a request be made within the 
initial ten-da> period as proscribed by subsection 24( c). Accordingly. he asserts that 
the trial court erred in its legal interpretation of Rule 24 thus erroneously denying his 
motion for new trial on procedural grounds. Any legal determinations which a trial 
court makes as a basis for denying a motion for new trial are reviewed for correc:ness. 
State v Loose. 2000 UT 1 K «J8, 994 P.2d 1237. 
B. The trial court erred in denying his motion on substantive grounds. 
Judge Laycock also denied Mitchelf s motion for new trial on substantive 
grounds. She concluded that Karrington's sworn statements contained in the affidavits 
were unreliable and inadmissible. As to what she learned from interviews with un-
named jurors, it is inadmissible hearsay under Rules 80 K 802 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (Id.). And that proper affidavits would have "included each juror's sworn and 
notarized testimony"; and that Karrington's "report of what some jurors said cannot be 
relied upon by the Court in making its decision at this time" (R. 225). The trial court 
found the second affidavit to be similarly deficient (Id.); and that Henningson's opinion 
as to Archuleta's guilt was inadmissible and irrelevant (Id.). Accordingly, the trial court 
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denied the motion for new trial on grounds that the two affidavits were only conjecture 
and inadmissible hearsay (Id.). 
Ultimately, however, she denied the motion based upon the her belief that 'Yione 
of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there was any error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the defendant as per Rule 
24(a)"" (R. 224-25). In regards to the first affidavit about the jury, the trial court 
concluded that "the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's consideration that 
Mr. Archuleta had made a deal with the state in exchange for his testimony could have 
changed the outcome of the trial" namely because the jurors' claims were basically that 
Archuleta and Mitchell were both guilty (R. 224). As to the second affidavit the trial 
court concluded that "the defendant had ample opportunity at trial to explore the facts 
claimed [in this affidavit] and to impeach the testimony of Mr. Archuleta. There is no 
relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would justify a new trial." 
In Utah Cwa trial court may grant a motion for a new trial 'in the interest of justice 
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights 
of a party/" State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ^47, 112 P.2d 1252, cert denied, 125 
P.3d 102 (quoting State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Mitchell asserts that the trial court abused her discretion in finding that a new trial 
wasn't justified on the grounds of new evidence as it related to Archuleta, and to his tried 
testimony in particular. At trial Archuleta was the only person who was able to link 
Mitchell to the theft of the truck and supposedly he was an eye-witness to the theft 
because he was outside his house smoking at the time the truck was taken. He testified 
that he observed someone, followed by a blue car, remove the truck from Henningson's 
driveway (R. 235: 8-10, 26). He also testified that Mitchell told him that "there was a 
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Commander Concrete truck the) were around the other day, they were b) wher that 
particular-that particular night and he had used a broomstick the) used to ditch it" h\ 
w edging the broomstick between the seat and the gas pedal and then letting the truck go 
into the canal (Id. at 13-14). In addition, Archuleta testified that he had a com ersaiion 
about what he'd seen with Henningson later that morning (Id. at 31 -32). 
Karringtoif s second affidavit details her conversation with Henningson about 
Archuleta. In this affidavit it was Karringtoif s sworn statement, based on an interview 
with Cecil Henningson, that Henningson had told her the following: One. that Archuleta 
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing. 
1 wo. that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into 
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next da). Three, that he did not see 
Archuleta on the earl) morning of the incident as had been reported to police by 
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was in\ oh ed in the theft 
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows. 
Henningson's statements to Karrington that he had never spoken w ith Archuleta 
until after the first hearing in this case, along with the fact that he didn't see hLr, early 
tiiat morning, is testimony that casts grave doubt on Archuleta's credibility and upon his 
testimony that Mitchell was involved with the theft of the truck. According!), Mitchell 
maintains that the interest of justice requires a new trial because there was a substantial 
adverse effect upon his rights at trial as it pertains to the new evidence presented in his 
motion for new trial concerning Archuleta's testimony. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Giles asks this Court to reverse the trial courfs decision 
and order a mistrial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of July. 2006. 
IargarerP. Lindsa) 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3rd day of July, 2006. 
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ADDENDA 
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Rule 22 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 912 
report is the subject of an appeal, the clerk shall include the 
sealed presentence investigation report as part of the record 
(c) Restitution 
(c)(1) The presentence investigation report prepared by the 
Department of Corrections shall include a specific statement 
of pecuniary damages as provided m Utah Code Section 
77-18 1(4) This statement shall include, but not be limited to, 
a specific dollar amount recommended by the Department of 
Corrections to be paid by the defendant to the victim(s) 
(c)(2) In cases where a specific dollar value is not known, 
and is not an accumulating amount, e g continuing medical 
expenses, the court may continue the sentencing If sentenc 
mg occurs, it shall be done with the concurrence of defense 
counsel/defendant and the prosecutor and an agreement shall 
be reached as to how restitution shall be determined In no 
instance shall the restitution amount be determined by the 
Department of Corrections without approval of the court, 
defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor If the parties 
disagree about the restitution amount, a restitution hearing 
shall be scheduled 
Rule 22. Sentence , judgment and commitment . 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which 
shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the 
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, otherwise orders Pending sentence, the court may 
commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recog 
nizance 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defen-
dant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed The prosecuting 
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced m 
defendant's absence If a defendant fails to appear for sen 
tence, a warrant foi defendant's arrest may be issued by the 
court 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of 
conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, 
and the sentence Following imposition of sentence the court 
shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and 
the time within which any appeal shall be filed 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court 
shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence The 
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall 
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and 
shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the 
court shall impose sentence m accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Code If the court retains jurisdiction over 
a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Hu-
man Services as provided by Utah Code Ann § 7 7-16a-
202(l)(b), the court shall so specify m the sentencing order 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment . 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court 
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant 
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment 
acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy
 n 
attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged 
anew or retned, or may enter any other order as may he j u 
and proper under the circumstances 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own 
initiative, grant a new trial m the interest of justice if there 
any error or impropriety which had a substantial advers 
effect upon the rights of a party 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made m writing Q^A 
upon notice The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or 
evidence of the essential facts m support of the motion If 
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence 
the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such 
time as it deems reasonable 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days 
after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the 
court may fix during the ten day period 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be m the same 
position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict 
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or m 
argument 
Rule 25. Dismissal wi thout trial. 
(a.) In its discretion, for substantial cause and m further 
ance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or 
upon application of either party, order an information or 
indictment dismissed 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment 
when 
(b)(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay w 
bringing defendant to trial, 
(b)(2) The allegations of the mformation or indictment, 
together with any bill of particulars furnished in support 
thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in 
the pleading so filed, 
(b)(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudi 
cial defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings relating to 
the grand jury, 
(b)(4) The court is without jurisdiction, or 
(b)(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of hmita 
tions 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in 
an order and entered in the minutes 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there 
was unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or 
the offense was not properly alleged in the information or 
indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the 
proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for 
the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such 
orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending 
the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require 
Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exoner-
ated 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in 
bringing the defendant to trial or based upon the statute oJ 
limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for thf 
offense charged 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor 
the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by tin 
defendant and the injured party The injured party shall firs 
acknowledge the compromise before the court or m writing 
The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein an 
entered in the minutes The order shall be a bar to anothe 
prosecution for the same offense, provided however, to* 
RICHARD P. GALE (7054) 
ANTHONY L. HOWELL (9506) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo,UT 84601 
Telephone: 852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MITCHELL, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 021403847 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Comes now, defendant Robert Mitchell, by and through counsel, Richard P. Gale 
and Anthony L. Howell, and Moves this court to grant the defendant a new trial. Defense 
counsel has learned that during deliberation jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in 
making their decision, which consideration violates Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Defense counsel is also investigation the possibility that additional evidence 
may exist which was not available at the time of trial. Defendant requests an evidenj&ry 
hearing. 
DATED this /o day of October, 2004. 
Richard P. Gale 
Anthony L. Howell 
Counsel for Defendant. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
X? 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this ' Q day of October, 2004, a copy of 
the foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE to the following: 
David Sturgill 
150 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
pn^j^^ .j 
RICHARD P. GALE (7054) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo.UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MITCHELL, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME 
TO SUBMIT AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
Case No. 021403847 
JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Defendant, ROBERT MITCHELL, by and through his counsel of record, Richard P. Gale, moves 
the Court to allow defendant until November 19, 2004 to file affidavit's in support of Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial. This motion is made based on the following facts: 
1. Defendant's investigator, Brooke Karrington, has spoken with the majority of the jurors involved 
in the case. Each of the jurors has agreed that during deliberations and in making their decision they 
considered the fact that they believed that the state's witness Tyler Archuleta had also been charged with 
the same offense as Defendant and worked out a deal with the state in exchange for his testimony. No 
evidence of this fact was ever presented by either party at trial. 
2. Ms. Karrington will provide an affidavit supporting the above facts to Defendant's attorneys by 
Monday, November 15, 2004. 
3. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 34(b) provides, "If additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable." 
WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the court allow defendant until Friday^November 19, 
2004 to supplement Defendant's motion with the supporting affidavit. '' 
DATED this ** day of Novenjb^fi 
Richard P. Gale 
Attorney for Defendant 
^ J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to David 
Sturgil at the Office of the Utah County Attorney, 100 Eas^J2€nteh Suite 2100, Pr/>vo, UT 84606, 
this 1 "^day of November, 2004. / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
11/M^ y fi J / ;; 
Anthony D. Howell 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
801.852.1070 
2? Pi, %4; 3<? 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ROBERT D. MITCHELL 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case# 021403847 
> 
State of Utah ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
BROOKE KARRINGTON, upon her oath, swears and deposes as follows 
1 I am a licensed private investigator in the State of Utah, and, 
2. I interviewed jurors of the Robert Mitchell jury trial in which Mr Mitchell 
was convicted, and, 
3. jurors told me that there was a consensus that the state's witness, Tyler 
Archuletta, was definitely involved in this incident, and, 
4 jurors told me that during their deliberations that the jurors had concluded that 
the state's witness, Tyler Archuletta, was testifying against Mr Mitchell in 
exchange for a reduction in his (Mr Archuletta's) own charges, and, 
5 jurors also told me that there was never any testimony or evidence that 
indicated Mr Archuletta had been charged or had negotiated a plea 
agreement, just that they had assumed that this was the case, and, 
6 jurors also told me that the consensus was frustration that the state had 
arranged a plea agreement with Mr Archuletta but not with Mr Mitchell, and, 
7 Further, affiant sayeth not 
Signed f W f e f iAAMyj 4 f ' 
Brooke Karrington 
Karrington Investigations, Inc. 
Utah Private Investigator License #100004 
Dated this { I day of November 2004 
I do affirm and certify, under applicable laws regarding false and misleading 
written statements, that I have read all of this Affidavit, and that I have executed 
this Affidavit, and that the facts as set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief 
' /I 
Signed { ^ t ^ ^ ^ H i W . 
Brooke Karrington 
Karrington Investigations, Tfoc. 
Utah Private Investigator License # 100004 
On the / ^ day of November 2004, personally appeared before me, Brooke 
Karrington, who acknowledged to me that she is the person who executed the 
foregoing Affidavit 
Signed S ^ C ^ / ^ CJ^^ 
Kimberlee Clem 
Notary Public 
My commission expires } "2- 3 ( - & 7 
ANTHONY L. HOWELL 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
801.852.1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
vs. ) NEW TRIAL 
ROBERT D. MITCHELL )
 A 
) Case# 021403847 / ^ 
Defendant. ) 
State of Utah ) 
. ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
BROOKE KARRINGTON, upon her oath, swears and deposes as follows: 
1. I am a licensed private investigator in the State of Utah, and, 
2. 1 interviewed Cecil Dustin Henningson, the victim and a state's trial witness 
in this matter, and, 
3. my interview with Mr. Henningson took place via telephone after the trial had 
taken place, and, 
4. Mr. Henningson stated to me that Tyler Archuletta, another state's witness in 
this matter, lives on the same street as Mr. Henningson, but he did not know 
that until after what he termed "the first court hearing", and, 
5. Mr. Henningson had never met Mr. Archuletta until after "the first court 
hearing", and, 
6 Mr Henningson stated that he "ran into Tyler in the neighborhood later that 
night or the next day" after the "first court hearing", and, 
7 Mr Henningson stated that he did not see Tyler Archuletta at 3:00 a.m. the 
morning of the incident, as Mr Archuletta stated to the police in the reports, 
and, 
8. Mr Henningson firmly believes that Tyler Archuletta was involved in the 
theft and the subsequent ransacking of his truck, and theft of items from the 
truck, because of the detail of the incident that Mr. Archuletta knows, and, 
9. Further, affiant sayeth not. 
Signed ' V^(r\U. JJfr^ASr*~~ 
Brooke Karrington \ 
Dated " 7 ^ day of I ^ M ^ r f 
I do affirm and certify, under applicable laws regarding false and misleading 
written statements, that I have read all of this Affidavit, and that I have executed 
this Affidavit, and that the facts as set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
signed ^hmkL J a v ^ u — 
Brooke Karrington 
On the ~7 day of BeeembW 2004," personally appeared before me, Brooke 
Karrington, who acknowledged to me that she is the person who executed the 
foregoing Affidavit 
Signed A *, ^ i-tJ^
 L C Xz i • 
Kimberlee Clem 
Paralegal 
Notary Public 
F I L E D 
Fourth Juti'c*1 District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
S--2-J&1 A .Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COl 
1 STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Y. 
ROBERT MITCHELL 
Defendant. 
JNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RULING REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Date: August 2, 2005 
Case No. 021403847 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 2 
This matter comes before the court upon the defendant's Motion For New Trial, 
submitted to the Court on May 18, 2005. The defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts: 
(1) theft and (2) criminal mischief-both second-degree felonies. The defendant seeks a new trial 
and alleges the following: (1) the jurors, during deliberation, considered evidence not presented 
at trial in making their decision in violation of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
and (2) the State's key witness, Tyler Archuleta, provided testimony at trial that was inconsistent 
with statements he had made previously to the police. 
PROCEDURE HISTORY 
1. On September 30, 2002 the state filed an information charging the defendant with 
theft, a second degree felony, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony. 
2. On August 23 and 24, 2004 a jury trial was held regarding the theft and criminal 
mischief charges. 
3. On August 24, 2004 the jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. 
4. On October 7, 2004 the defendant was sentenced. 
5. On October 18, 2004 the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial The defendant cited 
two grounds for granting his motion: (1) defense counsel "learned that during deliberation jurors 
considered evidence not presented at trial in making their decision;" and (2) defense counsel 
needed to investigate "the possibility that additional evidence may exist which was not available 
at the time of trial." (See Motion for New Trial) Neither a memorandum nor any affidavits 
accompanied the motion. 
6. On November 8, 2004 the state filed its response to the motion, arguing that the 
defendant had not complied with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
7. On November 12, 2004 the defendant filed its Motion to Extend Time to Submit 
Affidavits in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, requesting until November 19, 2004 
to file the necessary affidavits. The defendant did not file a notice to submit, nor did he provide 
an order for the Court's signature. The Court never ruled upon the motion to extend time. 
8. On November 22, 2004 the defendant filed a supportive affidavit from Brooke 
Karrington, a licensed private investigator, who had interviewed some of the jurors who 
participated in the defendant's trial. 
9. On January 10, 2005 the defendant filed a second affidavit from Brooke Karrington, 
who had interviewed Cecil Dustin Henningson, a witness at the trial. 
10. On February 15, 2005 the state filed its Amended Response to Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial 
11. On May 18, 2005 the defendant filed his Motion to Submit for Decision. 
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supporting "affidavits or evidence of the essential facts," nor did he request additional time to file 
such documents during the 10-day period following the defendant's sentencing hearing.2 
The defendant's October 18, 2004 motion consisted of a one-paragraph request: 
Comes now, defendant Robert Mitchell, by and through counsel, Richard 
P. Gale and Anthony L. Howell, and Moves this court to grant the defendant a 
new trial. Defense counsel has learned that during deliberation jurors considered 
evidence not presented at trial in making their decision, which consideration 
violates Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defense counsel is also 
investigation the possibility that additional evidence may exist which was not 
available at the time of trial. Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing, (sic) 
It was not until November 12, 2004 that the defendant filed his motion to extend time, 
which motion was really prompted by the state's arguments that the defendant's motion lacked 
the necessary affidavits and other supporting evidence. The motion to extend time was never 
granted by the Court, as no notice to submit was filed and the matter was not properly submitted 
to the Court. The defendant did not file the supporting affidavits until November 22, 2004 and 
January 10, 2005-31 and 80 days, respectively, after the 10-day time period had run on October 
22, 2004. The defendant never filed a memorandum explaining his theories regarding the facts 
alleged in the affidavits. 
The Court concludes that, even had the defendant properly requested that the Court rule 
on his motion to extend time, the Court could not have granted the motion to extend time under 
2For a discussion of the time limitations of Rule 24, please turn to a "not for official 
publication" per curiam decision which very succinctly explains the time restraints of this rule 
and the filing of supporting affidavits. See Utah v. Hanigan, 2002 UT App. 424; 2002 Utah 
App. LEXIS 280, filed December 12, 2002. Apparently, the Court of Appeals believes that Rule 
24's time limitations are so easily understood that publication of such a helpful opinion was not 
necessary. 
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DISCUSSION 
A. Timeliness of Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial court and 
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Pirela, 65 P.3d 307, 310 
(Utah App. 2003) {quoting State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)). The Court must 
first consider whether the defendant filed a timely Motion for New Trial according to Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 (a), (b), and (c) provide as follows: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion 
shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the 
motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may 
postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. 
See U. R. Cr. P. 24(a), (b), and (c) (2004) (emphasis added). 
The rule clearly provides that the defendant must file a motion, together with any 
supporting affidavits or evidence, within 10 days of imposition of the sentence. The defendant 
was sentenced on October 7, 2004 and then filed his Motion for New Trial on October 18, 2004— 
well within the 10-day time limit.1 Unfortunately, he did not simultaneously file the requisite 
'As per Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's deadline for 
filing the motion was Friday, October 22, 2004. The intervening weekends and the Columbus 
Day holiday would not have been included in the computation of time. 
i 
Rule 24(c), as that motion should have been filed during the 10-day period following the 
defendant's sentencing hearing, as per the second part of Rule 24(c). The rule does not allow the 
defendant to drop off a one-paragraph motion at the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24 
(c) and to then find the necessary evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as happened 
in this case. Clearly, the rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission for and 
schedule such extensions of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickly as possible. 
For these procedural reasons, the Court denies the defendant's motion for new trial. 
B. The Affidavits 
Although the Court has already denied the motion for new trial on procedural grounds, 
the Court will, nevertheless, address the merits of the motion. Although the defendant's motion 
for new trial requested an evidentiary hearing, the notice to submit requested that the Court 
"review defendant's Motion and Affidavits in Support and the state's Response and render a 
decision on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial." See defendant's Motion to Submit for 
Decision. Therefore, the Court has not set this matter for an evidentiary hearing and has 
reviewed the evidence before it, as found in the affidavits submitted by defendant. The Court 
finds that neither affidavit can be considered by the Court, as each is based upon hearsay and 
conjecture. 
Brooke Karrington's first affidavit, filed on November 22, 2004, says that she 
interviewed "jurors of the Robert Mitchell jury trial," but never includes their names or how 
many jurors she interviewed. Furthermore, her version of what these unknown jurors said is 
clearly inadmissible hearsay under Rules 801 and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Proper 
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affidavits in support of the defendant's theory would have included each juror's sworn and 
notarized testimony. Ms. Karrington's report of what some jurors said cannot be relied upon by 
the Court in making its decision in this matter. 
Ms. Karrington's second affidavit, filed on January 10, 2005, says that she interviewed 
Cecil Dustin Henningson after the trial by telephone. Although this affidavit contains much 
more detail than the earlier affidavit, the hearsay problems are exactly the same. A proper 
affidavit would have included Mr. Henningson's sworn and notarized testimony, not Ms. 
Karrington's version of what he told her. Again, the Court cannot rely upon such an affidavit in 
making its decision in this matter. 
In addition, paragraph 8 of this paragraph contains Mr. Henningson's inadmissible belief 
as to the alleged guilt of one of the other witnesses, Tyler Archuleta. Had such an opinion been 
offered at trial, the state would have objected and the Court would have sustained the objection. 
Mr. Henningson's personal belief as to Mr. Archuleta's or the defendant's guilt or innocence is 
irrelevant; only the jury could make that final decision. 
Therefore, the Court also denies the motion for new trial on the grounds that the two 
affidavits contained nothing more than inadmissible hearsay and conjecture. 
C Assumptions Made by the Jury 
Had the motion for an extension of time been timely filed and had the affidavits 
contained admissible testimony from the jurors and other witnesses, the Court would have still 
denied the motion for new trial. None of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there 
was any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the 
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defendant, as per Rule 24(a). 
Ms. Karrington reports in her first affidavit that the jury assumed during deliberations that 
Tyler Archuleta had been involved in the incident and had made a deal with the state in 
exchange for his testimony. The unnamed jurors were also, apparently, frustrated that "the state 
had arranged a plea agreement with Mr. Archuleta but not with Mr. Mitchell." (See Ms. 
Karrington's first affidavit, paragraph 5.) Without an explanatory memorandum from defendant, 
the Court can only assume that the defendant's argument is that these assumptions made by the 
jury somehow prejudiced the jury against him and, therefore, there was an error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon his rights, as per Rule 24(a). 
In State v. Becker, the Court of Appeals stated that "to justify a new trial, newly 
discovered evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved against the movant, or 
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial might be changed." Becker at 1294. Here, 
the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's conclusion that Mr. Archuleta had made a deal 
with the state in exchange for his testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial. If the 
jurors' claims to Ms. Karrington were relied upon by the Court, it could only appear to the Court 
that the jury concluded that both Mr. Archuleta and the defendant were guilty of the alleged 
crimes. Despite the claim that the jury wanted similar deals to have been offered to both men, 
the jury looked at the facts and found the defendant guilty. 
Furthermore, the defendant's rights were not substantially and adversely affected. The 
jury's conclusion that Mr. Archuleta was guilty was introduced and forcefully advocated by the 
defendant. Defendant's attorney proposed his theory of the case during closing arguments, as 
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pointed out by the state's responsive memorandum, placing the blame squarely on Mr. Archuleta. 
(See trial transcript, day two, p. 128.) Defendant is not entitled to a new trial because, in his 
opinion, the jury failed to place all responsibility on Mr. Archuleta and to absolve the defendant 
of all culpability. The Court concludes that there was no impropriety or error in the trial 
proceedings which would justify granting the defendant's motion. 
D. Alleged Inconsistent Testimony of a Witness 
Ms. Karrington's second affidavit states that the state's witness, Tyler Archuleta, told the 
police that he saw the victim, Mr. Henningson, at 3:00 a.m. the morning of the theft, while Mr. 
Henningson stated at trial that he did not see Mr. Archuleta. Aside from the fact that Ms. 
Karrington reports inadmissible hearsay evidence to the Court from the police incident reports, it 
is clear to the Court that both parties had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine Mr. 
Henningson and Tyler Archuleta about these facts. It was Mr. Henningson's testimony at trial 
that he saw no one else outside when he went outside at 3:00 a.m. (Trial transcript of testimony 
of Cecil Henningson, p.22.) Mr. Archuleta testified on direct examination that he did not see Mr. 
Henningson that night. (Trial transcript, day two, p. 11.) On cross-examination he also testified 
that he did not see Mr. Henningson "come running out of his house." (Id. at p. 29.) Both parties 
took advantage of the opportunity to question both witnesses about these particular facts; Ms. 
Karrington's affidavit offers no new evidence which was not or could not have been explored by 
the parties at the time of trial. 
In addition, the Court finds that paragraphs four through six of Ms. Karrington's affidavit 
contain hearsay evidence that would make absolutely no difference to the jury. When or where 
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Mr. Henningson may have run into Mr. Archuletta for the first time after the "first court hearing" 
is of no relevance or importance to the trier of fact in this matter, and the fact that they both lived 
on the same street was well explored at trial. 
The defendant had ample opportunity at trial to explore the facts claimed in Ms. 
Karrington's second affidavit and to impeach the testimony of Mr. Archuleta. There is no 
relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would justify a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court denies the defendant's Motion For New Trial. The Court orders the 
state to prepare and submit appropriate findings, conclusions, and order, pursuant to Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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